

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE

WILLIAM C. BLOOMQUIST,)
)
 Plaintiff)
)
 v.) Civil No. 03-276-P-S
)
 JUSTICE PAMELA ALBEE, et al.,)
)
 Defendants)

AMENDED¹
RECOMMENDED DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS
FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

In this action William Bloomquist is suing a cast of defendants in Maine and New Hampshire - some with starring, some with supporting, and some with backstage roles in Bloomquist's civil suit. In this recommended decision I address a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by New Hampshire District Attorney Robin Gordon as well as Sheriff Scott Carr and Officer Jonathan Hebert, employees of the Carroll County New Hampshire Sheriff's Office. (Docket No. 33.)² This dispute turns on their alleged involvement in the issuance of a New Hampshire protection from stalking order filed and prosecuted by a private party, Susan Benfield,³ which impacted Bloomquist's firearm rights. Bloomquist has filed a motion in opposition to the motion to dismiss (Docket No.

¹ This amendment merely corrects the caption, nothing in the body of the recommendation has been altered.

² The motion notes that while Carroll County is named as a defendant it has not been served. The movants promises to file a similar motion to dismiss on behalf of the County should service be accomplished. My treatment of the pleadings concerning the motion to show cause resolves this issue.

³ Defendant Scott Floccher, who has/had an association with Benfield, also filed a petition for a temporary restraining order against Bloomquist contemporaneous with Benfield's. I refer for the most part only to Benfield's as, as far as I can tell, she was the only one of the two to pursue a permanent order and file a motion for contempt which are also at issue in this case, nothing turns on Floccher's petition in particular, and it makes events a little simpler to follow if this discussion is pared down in this manner.

56) to which the defendants have replied (Docket No. 63). In his opposition Bloomquist moves for jurisdictional discovery.

In a related docket entry the Court has issued an order to show cause why, after more than 120 days has expired since the filing of the complaint, service of process has not been accomplished on defendants Judith Wohl, James Langella, Jerry Harkavy, and Carroll County, New Hampshire. (Docket No. 71.) Bloomquist has filed a response to that order which incorporates a motion to extend time for service (Docket No. 78)⁴ and on behalf of Carroll County these defendants have filed oppositions to this response and request (Docket Nos. 80 & 81).

I now **DENY** the request for jurisdictional discovery, as well as the motion for an extension of time for service as it pertains to Carroll County, and recommend that the Court **DISMISS** the action against Carroll County for failure to prosecute and **GRANT** the motion to dismiss by Gordon, Carr, and Hebert pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).

Discussion

Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery

There is no possibility based on Bloomquist's complaint and his response to this motion to dismiss that this court has general, as opposed to specific, personal jurisdiction over these defendants. See Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Canada, 46 F.3d 138, 144 (1st Cir. 1995); see generally Donatelli v. Nat'l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 462-63 (1st Cir.1990) (outlining and distinguishing the contours of general and specific personal jurisdiction).

⁴ This motion also contains a motion for service by publication but this request does not implicate Carroll County.

Therefore the court must determine if it has specific personal jurisdiction over Gordon, Carr, and Hebert. In Foster-Miller, Inc. the First Circuit explained:

The existence of specific personal jurisdiction depends upon the plaintiff's ability to satisfy two cornerstone conditions: "first, that the forum in which the federal district court sits has a long-arm statute that purports to grant jurisdiction over the defendant; and second, that the exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to that statute comports with the strictures of the Constitution." Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir.1994); see also Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 204 (1st Cir.1994); Hahn v. Vermont Law Sch., 698 F.2d 48, 51 (1st Cir.1983).

Although we deem the first of the cornerstone conditions to be self-explanatory, the second condition requires amplification. This condition implicates three distinct components, namely, relatedness, purposeful availment (sometimes called "minimum contacts"), and reasonableness:

First, the claim underlying the litigation must directly arise out of, or relate to, the defendant's forum-state activities. Second, the defendant's in-state contacts must represent a purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of that state's laws and making the defendant's involuntary presence before the state's courts foreseeable. Third, the exercise of jurisdiction must, in light of the Gestalt factors, be reasonable.

46 F.3d at 144 (quoting United Elec. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1089 (1st Cir.1992)).

Maine's Long Arm statute "is coextensive with the due process clause of the United States Constitution," Murphy v. Kennan, 667 A.2d 591, 593 (Me. 1995), and so this "court need only consider whether due process requirements have been satisfied." Suttie v. Sloan Sales, Inc., 1998 ME 121, ¶ 4, 711 A.2d 1285, 1286 (citing Mahon v. East Moline Metal Prods., 579 A.2d 255, 256 (Me.1990)).

This case requires me to assess whether Bloomquist has made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction in response to the defendants' motion to dismiss. "To defeat a motion to dismiss when the court uses [the prima facie] method," Bloomquist,

must make the showing as to every fact required to satisfy "both the forum's long-arm statute and the due process clause of the Constitution." U.S.S. Yachts, Inc. v. Ocean Yachts, Inc., 894 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir.1990); accord Dakota Industries, Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1389 (8th Cir.1991); American Express International, Inc. v. Mendez-Capellan, 889 F.2d 1175, 1178 (1st Cir.1989); CutCo Indus., Inc. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 364-65 (2d Cir.1986). This standard for deciding a motion to dismiss is commonly referred to as the "prima facie" standard or a standard requiring a "prima facie" showing. ...

The prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction must be based on evidence of specific facts set forth in the record. Kowalski v. Doherty, Wallace, Pillsbury & Murphy, 787 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir.1986). The "plaintiff must go beyond the pleadings and make affirmative proof." Chlebda v. H.E. Fortna & Bro. Inc., 609 F.2d 1022, 1024 (1st Cir.1979); see also Serras v. First Tennessee Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 875 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir.1989) (noting that plaintiffs may not rest on their pleadings to make the prima facie showing).

Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 675 (1st Cir. 1992) (footnote omitted).

The theory of these defendants' motion is simple: "Plaintiff's complaint contains nothing that indicates that these three defendants engaged in activity in Maine or could ever have expected to have been haled into a Maine court, federal or state, for actions they took as part of the New Hampshire court system." (Mot. & Mem. Dismiss at 2.) They argue that all three of these defendants have acted (if at all) apropos Bloomquist only in this New Hampshire civil stalking procedure filed by a private party, Susan Benfield.

With regards to Bloomquist's complaint allegations against Hebert, the defendants state that Hebert was notified by New Hampshire court officials that the court needed extra security for a stalking hearing involving Bloomquist as a respondent to two petitions for protections. Hebert made a phone call from New Hampshire to Maine officials to check on the background of Bloomquist, as Bloomquist was one of the parties to the petition. Hebert prepared a memo based on what he was told by Maine authorities

and made an in-state facsimile transmission to the New Hampshire courthouse. Hebert then provided extra security at the hearing. The only allegation pertaining to Carr is that he is Hebert's supervisor. And with respect to District Attorney Gordon, Bloomquist alleges that he informed Gordon that Benfield and Floccher had committed perjury in the New Hampshire stalking proceeding and Gordon, who was not involved in the stalking case, failed to investigate.

In response, Bloomquist first argues that these defendants should be estopped from arguing that the District of Maine does not have personal jurisdiction over them because when Bloomquist filed a motion to dismiss based on a lack of personal jurisdiction over him in the New Hampshire stalking proceedings non-moving co-defendant Justice Patten⁵ ruled that the New Hampshire state court did have jurisdiction over Bloomquist for purposes of taking action on the petition filed by a New Hampshire resident. As the defendants point out, these three individuals had absolutely no role in Patten's personal jurisdiction determination and, as I pointed out in my recommended decision on Patten's and his fellow judicial defendants' motion to dismiss, this estoppel argument is patently illogical and meritless.

In his second and third complaints Bloomquist argues that this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922, § 923, § 924, § 925A, and § 2265. At most⁶ these provisions might give a court federal subject matter jurisdiction but this does nothing to forward Bloomquist's argument that this court has specific personal jurisdiction over these defendants.

⁵ Patten is the co-movant in a similar motion to dismiss on personal jurisdiction grounds which I treat in a different recommended decision.

⁶ I am not in anyway suggesting that these firearm-related provisions in the criminal statutory title would in fact provide a basis for a private cause of action in federal court.

Next Bloomquist argues, in his fourth parry, that it is not necessary for a defendant to have a physical location in Maine to justify personal jurisdiction in this court. Broadly put, Bloomquist asserts that the fact that these defendants knew, or should have known, that the orders issuing from the New Hampshire proceedings might be enforced out-of-state means that they "purposefully availed themselves of federal and Maine jurisdiction." However, Bloomquist wholly fails in this section to allege that these three defendants did anything to secure or enforce the stalking order. (See Pl.'s Opp'n Mot. Dismiss at 4-6.)

In his fifth section Bloomquist asserts that Carr and Gordon are both liable for Carroll County's court's unconstitutional policy of erring on the side of caution and granting all temporary protection from stalking and abuse petitions. He claims that Benfield's Maine attorney told her to seek the order from the Carroll County court because counsel knew that the petition would be automatically granted "due to Defendants Gordon and Carr's unconstitutional policy of granting all temporary orders." (Id. at 6-7.) This argument is nonsensical as employees of a sheriff's office and a prosecutor cannot "grant" stalking petitions and even if they did act in any way vis-à-vis these petitions such actions would have taken place within New Hampshire.

In his sixth and seventh sections Bloomquist contends that District Attorney Gordon has sufficient contacts with Maine because Justice Patten threatened to have Gordon prosecute Bloomquist for an alleged misdemeanor violation of the New Hampshire final protection from stalking order. Bloomquist states that his alleged violation of the stalking order occurred in Baldwin, Maine. Not only does Bloomquist not cite to record support for his assertion that Patten threatened to have Gordon involved

in a prosecution of Bloomquist,⁷ this hypothetical threat by a third party does nothing to establish that Gordon purposefully availed herself of the benefits and protections of Maine law or that she could foresee being called into a Maine federal court as a consequence. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (observing that a unilateral activity of another party or a third person not sufficient). Bloomquist also asserts that Gordon knew that Carroll County had an unconstitutional policy of granting temporary protection orders and that she knew it had been used to drag a Maine resident into her jurisdiction. He faults Gordon for failing to investigate the evidence Bloomquist supplied to Gordon's office that the stalking order was obtained through fraud and perjury. Bloomquist believes that Gordon had a duty under New Hampshire law to take action. Certainly Gordon's failure to act was inaction in New Hampshire concerning a New Hampshire proceeding and the mere fact that Bloomquist was from Maine does not constitute an availment on Gordon's part of the benefits and protections of Maine law.

The eighth and ninth sections of Bloomquist's opposition pertain mainly to Hebert and the actions he took vis-à-vis the court proceedings and orders.⁸ On February 12, 2002, Hebert communicated with the Cumberland County Sheriff's Department to find out information about Bloomquist "under the guise" of seeking court security

⁷ In his opposition to the judicial defendants' motion to dismiss, Bloomquist cites to Justice Patten's final order for this same proposition but this order states nothing about a threatened future prosecution and does not mention Gordon or any other prosecutor. (Docket No. 51, Ex. 16, Attach. 17.)

⁸ Bloomquist also avers that temporary protection from stalking order by Justice Albee provided that all of Bloomquist's collection, inventory, and stockpiles of military weapons had to be turned over to a New Hampshire peace officer. Accordingly, on February 9, 2002, someone at the Carroll County Sheriff's Department communicated directly with Maine's Cumberland County Sheriff's Department in an attempt to fulfill this order. An officer at the Maine sheriff department told someone at the New Hampshire sheriff department that he would release the weapons to the New Hampshire sheriff's department if men and trucks were sent to move the weapons prior to the arrival that day of Bloomquist's Maine attorney who had a Maine court order that gave the attorney sole custody of the weapons. (Bloomquist Aff. at 1-2.) These allegations do nothing to establish that Hebert or Carr personally had anything to do with these communications.

information. Bloomquist states the Hebert received a lot of falsified information from this communication and that this information was "secretly" placed into evidence against Bloomquist in the final protection from stalking hearing the following day.

The report referenced by Bloomquist is captioned: "In the matter of Scott Floccher v. William Bloomquist and Susan Benfield v. William Bloomquist." In identifying Bloomquist the report indicates that Bloomquist was "Now living with 'Linda' who is Scott Floccher's ex-wife." The body of the report states:

Deputies from Cumberland County responded to [Bloomquist's] house to serve restraining orders[. T]hey seized in excess of 80 firearms of various models. Bloomquist has a gun turret on his deck at home, as well as an armored personnel carrier. Bloomquist holds proper federal licenses to have these guns.

According to the detective who handled this matter Bloomquist has been to USM law school, however, he has failed the bar exam 10 times. He holds himself out as an attorney even though he is not. He currently works for a lawyer[']s office in Maine as a paralegal-investigator. He has been "investigating" Floccher, for allegedly filing a false financial affidavit [in] a court in Maine.

In past allegations of assault Bloomquist was reported to have used a flashlight and a stun gun to assault his wife.

There is an assault charge on his record. He has also been charged with possession of marijuana. (Growing 11 plants)

According to authorities in Maine Floccher was reportedly thrown out of the Hells Angles. He is believed to be a heavy drug user. CAUTION Maine State police issued CAUTION for criminal gang member, reported to be verbally confrontational/Prospect to the Hells Angles. He has on criminal charge of violation of a TRO.

All of the above listed subjects went to a hearing in the Bridgton Court for the same type restraining-stalking orders. During this hearing Benfield reportedly reached for papers and Bloomquist slapped her hand away[. A]s a result, Floccher allegedly struck Bloomquist. This turned into an altercation in the court.

On 2-13-02 Bloomquist called the court and told the court he was bringing an armed Federal Marshal[] with him for his protection.

On 02-13-02 I have called the US Marshal[]'s Offices in Maine and NH. According to SA Rich Cooper the Marshal's office has NO [i]nvolvement in this matter. He also told me that if in fact someone comes to court claiming to be a Marshal he is requesting an immediate call....

....

CAUTION ----CAUTION---According to Cumberland County all the firearms were returned last Thursday to an Attorney Hendrick [who] is friendly with Bloomquist and is allegedly keeping them to sell.

Interestingly enough Bloomquist came with him to get the firearms. The subjects who came to assist him in retrieving his weapons were all carrying concealed weapons.

All Deputies are to be at the DCNCC on 2-14-02 [n]o later than 1030.

(Docket No. 35 Ex. 4, Attach. 5.) On both sides "POLICE INFORMATION ONLY NOT FOR RELEASE" appears at the bottom.⁹

In his opposition to the motion to dismiss Bloomquist contends that his report does not support Hebert's claim that he obtained the information solely for court security purposes or that Hebert's contact with Maine was limited. In support of this contention Bloomquist says that the information that he was living with Floccher's ex-wife was irrelevant to court security and he indicates that he was not even living with Linda at the time. The fact that he had a gun turret and armored personnel carrier, his troubles with passing the Maine bar, his investigation of Floccher for filing a false affidavit, and his charge for possession of marijuana, all were statements irrelevant to court security in Bloomquist view, some of which are false, and some of which were meant to bias the trial court against Bloomquist. He says that the description of the altercation in the Maine Bridgton District Courtroom on April 11, 2001, was falsified and based upon

⁹ Bloomquist alleges that the Chief Clerk of the New Hampshire court contacted the National Crime Information Computer System stating that Bloomquist was subject to a domestic violence stalking order, even though, in Bloomquist's opinion, the stranger stalking order did not meet that definition. I cannot identify how this action by a third party is probative of Hebert's contacts with Maine. Bloomquist also alleges that when Justice Patten issued a March 20, 2002, order he references Maine and Bloomquist's activities there, revealing Patten's intent that his order have effect in Maine. (See Docket No. 25, Ex.1, Attach 2.) He identifies Patten's order as a predicate for a phone call by a Maine prosecutor to Bloomquist's Maine attorney concerning Bloomquist's firearms. I fail to see how these allegations pertain in anyway to the jurisdictional question vis-à-vis these three moving defendants. Likewise, Bloomquist's (unsupported) assertion that agents of the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau searched his Maine home saying he had to turn over his weapons collection to the New Hampshire Carroll County Sheriff's Department because of a New Hampshire court order does not further Bloomquist's case that these three defendants purposefully availed themselves of the benefits and protections of Maine law.

Benfield's perjury. Bloomquist also complains that the final caution concerning the collection of Bloomquist's firearms in Cumberland County was false and inflammatory and was intended to alarm. However, at no time does Bloomquist explain in what way these representations were false, nor does he attribute the falsification to Hebert.

Bloomquist also faults Hebert for his handling of the quoted memo and blames him for allowing the memo to end up in front of the presiding judge in view of Hebert's current claim that it was meant only for the bailiff. Bloomquist asserts that Sheriff Carr admitted to Bloomquist's "agent" that it was standard procedure in the county to inform the judge as to any information he or she should know about a defendant.¹⁰ Certainly the mere fact the report contained information of Maine goings-on between these parties to a New Hampshire court proceeding does not turn Hebert's use of the memo in preparing a security plan for the New Hampshire hearing into a basis for specific personal jurisdiction in Maine.

Finally, Bloomquist faults Hebert for not explaining how he called detectives from Cumberland County with just one phone call. Bloomquist argues that Hebert had no evidence that Bloomquist resided in Cumberland County because Floccher and Benfield had falsely listed an Oxford County address for Bloomquist. It appears that Bloomquist is suggesting that, given this false lead, it would have taken more than one call for Hebert to determine which Maine county authority to call. And it is on this point, and this point alone,¹¹ that Bloomquist premises his case for jurisdictional discovery. Bloomquist states:

¹⁰ Bloomquist has no record support for this assertion.

¹¹ There are additional paragraphs summarizing factual issues but none of these are linked to the need for further discovery or even mention discovery. Indeed, they seem to be a pared down rehash of the latter segments of Bloomquist's earlier dated opposition memorandum to the judicial defendants' motion to

If a party needs jurisdictional discovery, that party has an obligation to request it in a timely manner. *Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp.* 482 F.2d 1079, 1085 (1st Cir. 1973) It is clear that Defendant Hebert and Defendant Carr had much more extensive contact with Maine than revealed to this Court. Defendant Hebert's "account" of a single innocent phone call to "some local police officer", "a Maine authority", or "Maine authorities" whom he currently "can't remember who" is highly questionable. So too is the allegation that all information was obtained "solely for court security purposes" when on its face the two page "memo" contains far more extensive false and defamatory information, and in fact the document was placed into evidence against Plaintiff ex parte. Only further discovery will reveal the truth in this matter.

(Pl.'s Opp'n Mot. Dismiss at 15.)

In sum, Bloomquist's argument that these allegations and his supporting documentation substantiate a purposeful availment on the part of these three defendants of the benefits and protections of Maine law is insufficient. As stated in Foster-Miller, Inc., "the in-state contacts must represent a purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of that state's laws and making the defendant's involuntary presence before the state's courts foreseeable." 46 F.3d at 144 (quoting United Elec. Workers, 960 F.2d at 1089) (emphasis added). I am confident that Bloomquist has not met his burden of making a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists in responding to this motion to dismiss. See Boit, 967 F.2d at 675.

And, with respect to his motion for jurisdictional discovery, Bloomquist simply has not "presented what amounts to a 'colorable' claim for personal jurisdiction" over Hebert, much less Carr, so as to warrant granting such a request. United States v. Swiss American Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 626 (1st Cir. 2001). Even if it took Hebert seven or

dismiss. (Compare Pl.'s Opp'n Mot. Dismiss at 16-19, Docket No. 56 with Pl.'s Opp'n Mot. Dismiss at 11-17.)

eight calls from New Hampshire to Maine to locate the proper defendants this would not change my analysis. Quite simply Bloomquist's speculation about Hebert (and Carr's) interrelations with Maine authorities is purely that: utter speculation and no further discovery is warranted on that question. See id. (party moving for jurisdictional discovery has "the obligation to present facts to the court which show why jurisdiction would be found if discovery were permitted").

Order to Show Cause and Motion for Extension of Time to Accomplish Service

The show cause order asked Bloomquist to show cause why he has not accomplished service on defendants Judith Wohl, James Langella, Jerry Harkavy, and Carroll County, New Hampshire, allowing more than 120 days to elapse in a case that he filed December 1, 2003. With respect to the Carroll County, Bloomquist responds:

Plaintiff requests an additional thirty days (30) to serve Defendant Carroll County. Plaintiff alleges that Carroll County Sheriff's department civil deputies and officers kept insisting that Defendant Robin Gordon is the "County Attorney" and thus she is the one to serve on behalf of Carroll County. Plaintiff did have Defendant Gordon served only to discover the error later in one of Defendants' responses. Plaintiff respectfully requests thirty (30) additional days to cure this defect.

(Pl.'s Response & Mots. to OSC at 2.)

The moving defendants object to this motion and Bloomquist's response to the Order to show cause vis-à-vis Carroll County. It is my view that the defendants' opposition to the motion to extend time ably articulates why Bloomquist is not entitled to this extension of time:

This Court's order unambiguously required Bloomquist to show why service had not been timely made. With respect to "State of New Hampshire, Carroll County", he made no attempt to explain why no service was attempted or why so much time has passed without a single attempt to serve it. Rather, he let the 120-day deadline pass without a word and no request for more time. On May 17, 2004, defendants Gordon, Carr,

and Hebert filed a motion to dismiss that informed Bloomquist on the very first page that “State of New Hampshire, Carroll County” had never been served. Despite that notice, Bloomquist still took no action.

Although Bloomquist claims in his response to the Order to Show Cause that he was told Robin Gordon was the person on whom to serve the State of New Hampshire, Carroll County’s summons, this claim defies credibility. The summons served on Robin Gordon, which has been filed with this Court, clearly indicates that she was served in her capacity as an individual, and makes no mention of “State of New Hampshire, Carroll County” at all. Moreover, as Bloomquist admits, he later discovered “the error.” He offers no explanation as to why he then did absolutely nothing to correct that error. That was the point of the Order to Show Cause.

Finally, to the extent his claim is even true that he was misled as to whom to serve, the fact is that he is responsible for complying with the rules of procedure and he has no excuse for not complying with them. Suggesting that he relied on what some unidentified deputies and officers told him means that he did not take responsibility to acquaint himself with the correct procedure on his own, as required.

(Def.'s Opp'n Mot Ext. Time at 1-2, Docket No. 80.) I **DENY** the motion for an extension of time for service as it pertains to Carroll County. I further recommend that the Court **DISMISS** Carroll County as a defendant due to Bloomquist's failure to accomplish service in a timely manner.

Conclusion

For the reasons given above I recommend that the Court **GRANT** the New Hampshire County Defendants' motion to dismiss (Docket No. 33) on the ground that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over these individuals. I now **DENY** the request for jurisdictional discovery and the motion for an extension of time for service as it pertains to Carroll County. I further recommend that the Court **DISMISS** Carroll County as a defendant due to Bloomquist's failure to accomplish service in a timely manner.

NOTICE

A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate judge's report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which *de novo* review by the district court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within ten (10) days of being served with a copy thereof. A responsive memorandum shall be filed within ten (10) days after the filing of the objection.

Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right to *de novo* review by the district court and to appeal the district court's order.

/s/ Margaret J. Kravchuk
U.S. Magistrate Judge

August 26, 2004

BLOOMQUIST v. ALBEE et al

Assigned to: JUDGE GEORGE Z. SINGAL

Referred to: MAG. JUDGE MARGARET J.
KRAVCHUK

Demand: \$

Lead Docket: None

Related Cases: None

Case in other court: None

Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

Date Filed: 12/01/03

Jury Demand: None

Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights:

Other

Jurisdiction: Federal Question

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